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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent changes in the structure of central European and Eurasian
states present the international financial markets with a unique set of
opportunities and some formidable dilemmas.' In the newly emerging
economies of Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
others there are high interest rates, and currencies which are usually non-
convertible or at best partially convertible. Turkey is viewed as central in
this setting. Since the economic decline of Beirut, Turkey has increas-
ingly assumed the role of the regional financial center, providing access
to such services as financial expertise, trading, and more generally pro-
viding an eastern gate to these markets for the industrialized nations of
the West.
While high interest rates may be in keeping with high inflation and
the necessity to attract capital for sovereign projects,2 at the private level
* Professor of Economics and Finance at The City University of New York's Graduate Center.
Dr. Dasgupta has worked as a consultant to the Turkish Capital Markets Board and the Turkish
Ministry of the Economy. B.S. St. Xavier's College, Calcutta University, PhD in Economics, Syra-
cuse University.
** B.A. Syracuse University, Juris Doctor Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law,
Masters of Management Candidate, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management.
I See Anderson, Gilbert and Powell, Center for Economic Policy Research, London
SWlY6LA; article no. 295, April 1989. Among other factors these dilemmas include the risk of
default that is invariably weighed against the likelihood of attractive interest payments, the decision
on whether to purchase default insurance from a third party, which can significantly increase costs
for the lender etc.
2 Capital flows are usually directed towards regions with highest available returns, ceteris
paribus. In recent years German interest rates have been maintained at high levels to attract interna-
tional capital necessary to finance growth in Eastern Germany. When exchange rates are fixed, the
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high inflation and non-convertibility compounded with domestic risk
considerations translate into a severe paucity of funds. However Western
sources of capital realize the potential, on a macroeconomic level, of
these new markets.3
In view of these issues, this paper proposes an optimal approach to
design and regulation of commodity contingent instruments for private
enterprises. The design of these instruments is likely to significantly alle-
viate the capital constraints in emerging markets, particularly in Eurasia.
A commodity contingent security usually consists of a combination of a
traditional debt security (a bond) and several units of a financial instru-
ment, the payoff of which is in some well-defined way linked to the price
of a traded commodity. Although commodity contingent securitization
can, in theory, be applied at both the national and the private level, the
proposals in this paper are directed mainly toward private sector fund-
ing. Government plays an important and complementary role in deter-
mining the success of these instruments. Government should provide tax
subsidies to external sources of private sector capital, design a regulatory
framework that preserves the integrity and professional reputation of
these infant markets, and, more generally, foster a social consensus for
entrepreneurship and growth.
It is important to distinguish between the two sources of risk which
international capital intermediaries (banks, for example) face. Sovereign
risk arises from the possibility of default when funds are lent at the na-
tional level. The other sources of risk generally arise from the volatility
of cash flows from the public sector projects funded by such loans. The
poor service record on Less Developed Country (LDC) debt during the
1980's4 has had severe balance sheet related consequences for creditor
banks. To an important extent this reflects the failure of banks to distin-
ability of monetary policy to influence the level of interest rates is limited. Eight European coun-
tries, including Germany belong to a subsystem called the European Monetary system, that main-
tains a fixed exchange rate between these countries, but freely fluctuates as a group against the U.S.
dollar. Thus Germany's insistence on maintaining high interest rates had to be validated by the
others in the system, often leading to difficult policy co-ordination between the respective European
central banks. For an in depth treatment of these issues see Dornbusch and Frenkel (eds.) Interna-
tional Economic Policy: Theory and Evidence, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1985.
3 In a recent study (Journal of Portfolio Management Vol. 19. No. 1 Fall 1992) BARRA, Inc.
analysts, Divecha, Drach and Stefek have found that investing in Mutual funds of emerging markets
can actually lower the risk and increase the return of internationally diversified portfolios. Specifi-
cally they find that "".. . Over the past five years, a global investor who put 20 percent in an
emerging market index fund would have reduced overall annual portfolio risk from 18.3 percent to
17.5 percent while increasing annual return from 12.6 percent to 14.7 percent.
4 In the 1970's there was a surge in lending to Latin American nations by U.S. banks. Subse-




guish between sovereign default risk and other sources of risk. In situa-
tions in which private sector debtors default on contractual obligations,
creditors have greater protection by securing assets or the potential for
recourse through courts. Clearly such protection does not exist when the
counterparty is a sovereign government. Thus servicing of public debt is
largely a voluntary action, where the sovereign compares the costs and
benefits of full default to the alternative of debt rescheduling or
refinancing.
The sovereign risk problem has spillover effects on project specific
and general obligation bank loans to private enterprises. Accordingly, a
private sector loan, which by definition does not carry the sovereign risk,
is incorrectly perceived to include a sovereign component. In reality in-
vestors and lending institutions are confused about illiquidity or non-con-
vertibility of currency and linking this with the sovereign risk. Proposals
to tackle the seemingly intractable problem of sovereign risk range from
conventional ideas, such as third party insurance provided by an interna-
tional agency such as the IMF, to stricter ones requiring the borrower to
pledge collateral.
Two issues must be clearly understood in the context of misap-
praisal of sovereign risk. First, while sovereign risk does not exist for
private enterprise loans, the diffusion of national level loans, if any exist,
may cause foreign private capital to be more forthcoming. Second, the
absence of sovereign risk does not imply that private enterprise loans are
less risky than sovereign loans. In fact default risk in these loans may be
significant,5 and may be easily hidden from the international investor due
to informational asymmetries. High default probabilities arise when the
contractual obligations are negatively related to the borrower's ability to
pay. Commodity contingent securities can reverse this negative relation-
ship and thereby minimize default risk. The pricing of this minimal de-
fault risk can be obtained from any of the well-known risk-pricing
models,6 enabling the hybrid security to be traded on the open market.
The problem of obtaining capital via hybrids is then reduced to proper
packaging and marketing of these instruments.7
5 D. Anderson Small Industries in Developing Countries: A Discussion of Issues in World
Development 10, no. 11: 913-948 finds default risks that range from 10 percent to 60 percent.
6 For example it is widely understood in finance, that a simple insurance, viewed as a put op-
tion, can be priced through the Black-Scholes option pricing model, or any other appropriate actua-
rial model. See, for example, R. Merton, Continuous-Time Finance, 424.
7 Developed capital markets of the West have witnessed a proliferation of hybrid instruments
during the 1980s. For example a highly successful crude oil price contingent bond was issued by The
Standard Oil Company of Ohio (SOHIO) in 1986. A good discussion of the SOHIO contract can be
found in the article Regulation of Commodity-Linked Debt and Depository Instruments by Jordan,
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The article is organized as follows. In Section II new markets are
described and the typical problems that characterize these markets are
analyzed. Section III examines the overall financial position of Turkey
and why it is critically poised to assume a key role in the development of
the Eurasian markets. Section IV introduces the reader to the design and
basic tools of commodity contingent securities and provides some exam-
ples. It also discusses the potential of such instruments as risk manage-
ment products in emerging markets and addresses the regulatory and
institutional frameworks under which these securities are likely to suc-
ceed. Furthermore, the new version of Turkey's Capital Market Law
and the provisions in this law that relate specifically to the development
of commodity contingent instruments are examined. Section V provides
overall conclusions and developments that are expected to follow in the
wake of regulatory and economic reforms.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF NEW MARKETS
In the newly formed countries of Eurasia, formal capital markets in
the Western sense do not exist. What does exist are informal sources of
finance such as family, friends, local moneylenders, and curb markets.
While finance of this type has been largely unsuccessful in fostering pros-
perity and growth, information accumulated by these traditional sources
has proven to be invaluable in making a proper transition to capital
driven economic growth. Authors such as Malcolm Harper" have ex-
pressed a rather pessimistic view regarding the ability of capital markets
to grow in developing countries. This is largely based on the notion that
small scale entrepreneurs do not have the sophistication to distinguish
between debt and equity, or long term and short term financing.
While the preceding viewpoint needs to be taken into consideration
in making capital allocation decisions, it should be pointed out that re-
cent experiences of countries such as Brazil, Chile, India, and Indonesia,
have been uniformly the opposite. In these countries, capital constraints
arise primarily due to informational asymmetries between the SSE (small
scale enterprises) and the lending institution. There also exist certain
types of market imperfections, such as natural monopolies and cartels,
imperfect foresight, and an incomplete set of financial instruments.
Other imperfections arise due to state intervention in controlling interest
rates, rationing and directed loan allocation in favor of or against small
Mackay and Moriarty in The Handbook of Financial Engineering, Smith & Smithson (Eds.), Pub-
lisher: Harper & Row, page: 554-557.
8 M. Harper, Small Businesses in the Third World (1984).
Commodity Indexed Securitization
13:593(1993)
and medium scale enterprises, taxation of dividends, and regulatory lim-
its on expansion and new product development.
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Figure 1: True Risk and Perceived Risk of SSE
A. Perceived Risks
One imperfection related problem that arises due to asymmetric in-
formation between the capital intermediary and the SSE is that of trans-
actions costs. Often the costs of investigating the risk inherent in a
particular loan are disproportional to the size of the loan. This means
that at the warranted rate of interest (cost of capital), the expected net
present value of cash flows are insufficient to support the project to frui-
tion. This disproportionality may be eliminated if collateral is available;
however such is rarely the case for SSEs, especially start ups.
Akerlof9 discusses a systematic bias that frequently arises in the fi-
nancing of SSEs. According to Akerlof's theory, given the high cost of
loan investigation, the high risk nature of SSEs, and the common percep-
tion that SSEs are high risk, a uniformly high level of risk is assessed on
all loans sought by individual SSEs. Figure 1 exhibits the situation asso-
ciated with the so-called "lemon gap." The true risk of a representative
SSE is given by Wt, whereas the perceived risk is Wp. Given the overall
market risk and the rates of return on the market and the risk-free rate
9 Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality of Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 84 (1970).
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(Wm, RM and RF respectively), the Capital Asset Pricing Model 0
projects a fair cost of capital for the SSE at R. However, due to the
incorrectly assigned across-the-board level of risk, the actual cost of capi-
tal to the SSE is Rp. As a result the lowest common denominator (the
riskiest SSE) forces the better projects out of the market. This exagger-
ated risk usually does not arise with local moneylenders who possess bet-
ter information on the borrower's activities. In this respect, informal
capital markets are much closer to the full-information model than the
formal institution based structure.
B. Venture Capital Funds
The provision of venture capital funds can prove to be of great ad-
vantage in emerging markets for many reasons. One immediately obvi-
ous reason is the elimination of the lemon gap. Since venture capitalists
are significantly closer to the small business borrower than an ordinary
corporate lending institution, their information set is much more precise.
This more precise information will lead to the proper allocation of re-
sources, although transactions costs will increase since only a fraction of
all applications will be accepted. One significant problem that arises with
the traditional system, however, is that while venture capital funds may
be successfully used in funding business start-ups and smaller working
capital requirements when the business has established some ground,
they are woefully inadequate when larger amounts of capital need to be
infused for the purpose of expansion and long term planning.
It is precisely for such large scale expansionary activity, leading to
export oriented operations, that commodity contingent securities (CCSs)
are proposed. Specialized funds consisting of CCSs can provide much
needed capital; these funds can then be traded on second tier markets,
10 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), was developed independently by John Lintner
(1965), Jan Mossin (1966) and William Sharpe (1964). Their respective versions are different only in
terms of some initial assumptions but lead to the same conclusion: market prices of portfolios con-
taining assets with uncertain cash flows must bear a consistent relationship with the overall risk-turn
characteristics of the .""market portfolio." The overall market portfolio is typically proxied by the
S&P 500 index. This consistent relationship is quantified to arrive at an equation called the Capital
Market Line which provides the market warranted return for all securities, given their total
""amounts" of risk. This risk measure is the .""beta" of the asset and is equal to the ratio of the
covariance of the asset return with the market's and the variance of the market's return. The
CAPM, or some version of it, has been used to project the fair cost of capital for a firm. To gain a
detailed understanding of the CAPM see for example William Sharpe's original article Capital Asset
Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium in Journal of Finance 1964. This theory and the other
related and unrelated research contributed to William Sharpe co-receiving (with Harry Markowitz
and Merton Miller) the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1991.
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and thereby obtain a market valuation of the firm's capital structure. In
this regard the debt to equity ratio of the firm plays a pivotal role.
The Modigliani-Miller theorem notwithstanding,11 a higher debt/
equity ratio, ceteris paribus, increases the risk of the firm. It has been
argued that once investment policy (i.e. investment projects) is identified,
the risk of cash flows is known. Thus fixed interest payments against
such cash flows should not cause any unanticipated risk. However, in-
creasing leverage also increases expected bankruptcy costs, leading to the
conclusion that there is an optimal level of debt, one that minimizes ex-
pected bankruptcy costs. A generalization may be made at this juncture.
The higher the risk of an enterprise the lower its leverage should be,
making equity investments the natural choice. However outright equity
investment may not be forthcoming when risks are high, suggesting the
use of equity derivatives, convertible debt, debt issued with commodity
calls, and a whole gamut of other possibilities.
Limits on the level of the debt/equity ratio that lenders are usually
willing to tolerate vary from 1:1 in countries like Bulgaria and Ukraine to
2:1 in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Baku, and others of the
former Soviet republic. Table I shows incentives available in some se-
lected countries for investments in venture capital funds. In the United
States incentives for venture capital investment appear only as a part of
government funds allocated to R & D expenditures. Certain countries,
such as Japan, do not have any incentives for venture capital investment.
Under its new policies, Turkey offers significant opportunities for both
domestic and international venture capital.
III. TURKEY: MARKET REFORMS AND THE
NEW ECONOMIC POLICY
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the Turkish
economy, with specific emphasis on its financial sector. The last decade
witnessed an era of stabilization and structural change in Turkey. Eco-
nomic programs, evolving in accordance with the agreements and finan-
cial support of the World Bank and the IMF, have had far-reaching
impacts domestically and on neighboring economies. This is under-
scored by Turkey's increasing consolidation of the role of the regional
financial center.
The broad objectives of Turkey's stabilization program consisted of
11 The Modigliani-Miller theorem finds that under perfect capital market conditions, the debt to
equity ratio of the firm is irrelevant in determining the value of the firm. The original article titled
"The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment," appears in The Ameri-
can Economic Review 48 (1958).
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TABLE I: VENTURE CAPITAL FUND INCENTIVES
Country Incentives Capital Markets
U.S.A. Finance tied to govt. R&D policy NASDAQ
U.K. BES (Business Expansion Schemes) Unlisted Securities
tax subsidies to individuals Markets
West Germany None None
Japan None OTC Market
Canada Tax concessions on dividends, None
capital gains
France Tax concessions to start-ups and Second March6
VCFs; guarantees to investors in
risky enterprises
Turkey Tax exemptions to VCFs; tax Proposed Istanbul
concessions on dividends, capital second tier market;
gains; international tax treaties; New approved
transactions costs minimizing Commodities and
trading systems. Futures markets
Sources: Financial Times supplement "Venture Capital," December 1987; and the Capital Market
Board of Turkey.
restoring economic growth with low inflation levels, promoting the reli-
ance of the economy on market forces, and reducing the role of the pub-
lic sector. To achieve these objectives the following policies and reforms
were utilized:
1. Liberalization of exchange rate policies and payments systems
to achieve a fully convertible traded currency;
2. Interest rate deregulation and financial sector reform;
3. Foreign trade and investment regime reform; and
4. Public sector reform by converting SEES (State Economic En-
terprises) to private businesses.
In 1980 the IMF approved a three-year standby arrangement for Special
Drawing Rights12 (SDR) of 1,250 million. In 1983, an additional one
year arrangement was approved for SDR of 225 million to be followed by
another SDR of 225 million in 1984. These arrangements contained
quantitative performance criteria, including limits on the net domestic
assets of the Central Bank and Central Bank credit to the public sector
and annual limits on short term debt. In addition, the World Bank ex-
tended sizable project lending and five consecutive Structural Adjust-
ment Loans totaling $1.6 billion.
12 Special Drawing Rights are available only to approved members of the International Mone-
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Figure 2: Exchange Rate Movements
A. Main features of the Adjustment Program
1. Exchange Rate and Payments Regime. Figure 2 exhibits exchange
rate movements of the Turkish Lira (TL) against the U.S. dollar and the
Deutsche Mark (DM). The fundamentally different new regime evolved
in three stages. First, the currency was devalued by 33% in January,
1980, and subsequently small adjustments were made in increasing fre-
quency. In May, 1981, the authorities began adjusting the exchange rate
on a daily basis. Starting in 1988, the exchange rate was determined in
the open market with Central Bank participation. Multiple exchange
rate practices were phased out and the payment system was liberalized.
The new regime allows banks to open foreign currency accounts and
trade freely in the currency market.
2. Financial Markets Reforms. Financial reform began with interest
rate deregulation and later extended to capital markets. In 1982 the
Capital Market Board was established as the regulatory body for the se-
curities markets. A treasury securities market was established in 1985
and an interbank money market was introduced in 1986. The Istanbul
Stock Exchange was reopened in the same year. The Central Bank
opened the Gold Market in 1989. The process of securitization and inno-
vation led to the introduction of active markets on T-bills, commercial
paper, and mutual fund certificates.
3. Foreign Trade and Investment Regime. Import liberalization started
in 1984. The new system eliminated quantitative restrictions and re-
duced tariff rates. The main tool for export promotion was the exchange
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rate policy which maintained and increased the competitiveness of the
economy. In addition, the government provided tax rebates for export-
ers, preferential export credits, and foreign currency retention. Follow-
ing trade account liberalization, the government also liberalized capital
account transactions in 1988 and 1989.
4. Public Sector Reform. The authorities first arranged tax brackets,
unified corporate tax rates across industries, introduced the value added
tax system, and improved the tax collection mechanism. A comprehen-
sive Privatization program aimed at converting State Economic Enter-
prises to private enterprises was launched in 1986.
B. Financial Markets
The Turkish financial markets are dominated by treasury issues and
corporate equity, both held primarily by the commercial banking sector.
Although trends indicate that small investors are participating increas-
ingly in the stock market, the gold market has recently undergone a de-
centralizing change. Accordingly, the Central Bank is no longer the sole
authority for gold bullion or certificate transactions.
The expansionary phase of economic activity which began in 1989
continued in 1990 and 1991. In 1990 the total public sector securities
issued in the primary market increased 26 percent to a value of TL 21.5
trillion.13 Private sector permits for issuing securities increased 174 per-
cent to TL 6.3 trillion. This upward trend continued through 1991. In
the following sections each of the markets is examined in some detail.
1. The Primary Securities Markets
These markets are essentially dominated by treasury issues, both
short term and long term. Government bonds and treasury bills have
grown in correspondence with the increase of the budget deficit. In 1991,
the amount of government bonds available in Turkey stood at TL 16.5
trillion, while treasury bills were at TL 10.2 trillion. In 1990, the market
value of permits for private sector securities stood at TL 6.3 trillion.
Stocks accounted for TL 4.1 trillion and the rest was broadly classified as
corporate debt. During 1991 the average increase of private sector secur-
ities was 10 percent over the previous year's value. Of these securities,
mutual fund certificates accounted for the largest increase.
2. The Secondary Securities Markets
In 1990 the value of securities traded in the secondary markets
13 The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Annual reports 1990, 1991 1st. 2 quarters.
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stood at TL 116.3 trillion. In 1991 the market rose to TL 272.5 trillion.
In both years an average of 14 percent of total transactions occurred in
the stock market and 86 percent was attributable to the markets for pri-
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Figure 3: Istanbul Stock Exchange Overall Trading Value
cial papers, revenue sharing certificates, and foreign currency indexed
bonds. Both quoted and unquoted systems were in effect starting June
11, 1990. Figure 3 shows the fluctuations in the market value of the
Istanbul Stock Exchange index, which is a value weighted average of 50
industrial and commercial stocks. It is clear that the market is actively
traded and undergoes large swings in volatility. It may also be noted that
the foreign and non-resident purchases of the ISE index and other stocks
have seen significant increases in the last fiscal year.
3. The Gold Market
The gold market serves a unique function in Turkey and its sur-
rounding regions. Traditionally, gold has been a store of value in Eastern
societies. The Turkish gold market occupies the central distribution po-
sition for gold transactions for a majority of Middle Eastern and South
Asian countries, such as the Emirates, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and
Qatar. Recently independent countries of the former Soviet Union have
looked to Turkey for capital and technology flows as well as vehicles to
mitigate risks in their new commercial ventures. Frequently, due to the
unavailability of convertible currencies, these countries prefer transac-
tions in gold or gold related securities. This has necessitated the develop-
ment of a fully integrated spot as well as futures market in gold. Until
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March of 1992, the Central Bank has been the sole authority in the gold
transactions market. Gold prices moved accordingly (see Figure 4).
With the dissolution of the Central Bank monopoly, the need for stan-
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Figure 4: Central Bank Gold Auction Prices
4. Derivative Securities and Legislation
The general category of derivative securities includes the traditional
equity contingent claims (calls and puts) and the proposed commodity
contingent instruments. Prior to the passage of the new Capital Market
Law (1992), no provisions were available for the issuance of contingent
claims of any sort. As a result, forwards and related types of contracts
based primarily on interest rates and agricultural commodities, occupied
an undefined section of the market. Concurrently there was no degree of
standardization of these contracts. Furthermore taxation and balance
sheet treatment of the same were undefined, or, at best, vaguely under-
stood. Article 13 of the Capital Market Law, which dealt previously
with only the issuance of bonds, has been much expanded in scope. Spe-
cifically, Article 13-A 14 authorizes:
Asset Backed Securities collateralized by the receivables and fixed assets
can be issued. The issuer institutions of these securities, issuing require-
14 The Law Concerning The Capital Market, Law No. 2499, Date of approval 7.28.1981, is the
precursor of the current version of the Capital Market Law. In the original version Article 13 deals
with the issuance of bonds by stock corporations, and provides guidelines and limits on the total
amount issuable under the law. Specifically, such amounts were not to exceed the residual amount,
which is yielded after deducting the losses (if any) from the total sum of the issued capital shown on
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ments, issue limits, eligible receivables and assets, the principles and essen-
tials of evaluation and qualifications shall be regulated by communiques to
be prepared by the Board.
The limits stated in Article 13 shall not be applied to the issuance of asset
backed securities.
The implications of this article are far-reaching. The Article lays
the foundation for the design of a variety of asset contingent securities,
which shall fall under the regulatory oversight of the Capital Market
Board, comprehensively reducing the Board's search costs and other
costs related to quality, delivery, and related provisions. The Board
maintains considerable latitude in evaluating the qualifications needed
for the approval of a specific instrument. This degree of latitude allows
for speedy approval of instruments which under more restrictive statutes
would lead to inevitable bottlenecks between the capital needs of the is-
suer and the timing of issuance.
The limits set for bonds in Article 13 state that:
The total value of bonds and other borrowing instruments qualified as capi-
tal market instruments issued by publicly held joint stock corporations may
not exceed the residual amount which is yielded after deducting the losses,
if any, from the total sum of the issued or paid up capital stated on the
latest financial statement which is audited independently and sent to the
Board and the reserve money and the reevaluation fund stated on the latest
financial statement approved by the general assembly.
The exemption of asset contingent securities from the limits set by Arti-
cle 13 implies that such securities are likely to be treated as off balance
sheet items. This aspect of accounting treatment of certain types of de-
rivative securities has been criticized on grounds that it may potentially
understate the actual leverage of the firm. However the advantages of
this practice in terms of firm restructuring and future divestiture of ven-
ture capitalists are also recognized. In any event, accounting for the in-
clusion of these items must be carefully evaluated. In the United States
and Britain, for example, hedge accounting, which relates to derivative
positions that offset price movements of the primary security, as opposed
to speculative positions in the same, poses some challenging issues in ac-
counting principles.
Foreign currency and precious metal exchanges are covered under
the latest balance sheet approved by the General Assembly, or the total sum of paid-up capital and
the reserve money indicated on the balance sheet.
The Recent Amendments to the Capital Market Law were approved on 10.14.1992, and specifi-
cally expanded in scope through Article 13A. to include the issuance of Asset Backed securities,
such as stock and bond options, commodity options and other categories such as may be deemed to
be asset backed. The Article specifies the nature of institutions that can issue such securities, issuing
limits, eligible receivables and assets, the principles and essentials of evaluation and qualifications
that shall be regulated by communiques from the The Capital Market Board.
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Article 40-A' 5 of the Capital Market Law. According to this article, the
Ministry of Finance has the authority to establish the related exchanges.
This article is essentially the culmination of the several steps taken dur-
ing the last decade to make the currency fully convertible and thereby
obtain a market-oriented valuation of the Turkish Lira.
A set of significant changes to the restriction of commercial banks
related to the funding of investment indeces (which may contain asset-
backed securities) has been abolished in the new version of the Law. Ac-
cordingly Articles 41 through 44 have been eliminated. These Articles
set subjective and quantitative limits on the participation of banks in the
portfolio of the fund, and vice versa. For example, Article 41-c required
that:
The managing bank may not include in its portfolio the securities of
corporations, where its shareholders, Chairman and Members of its Board
of Directors, its general manager and assistant general managers own
jointly or individually more than 25 percent of the capital....
The abolition of these requirements implies that banks or any other
institutions that will initiate venture capital funds will in no sense be
restricted to directly participate, manage, and expand the operations of
any firm that participates in such funds. In this respect banking and
other similar capital intermediary operations are most likely to resemble
those of the continental European finance houses, such as the legendary
French Credit Mobilier, or the German banks, rather than the British or
American counterparts which deal solely in providing loans and have
historically avoided equity commitments.
IV. COMMODITY CONTINGENT SECURITIZATION
A commodity contingent security is understood to be a financial ob-
ligation whose terms and payoffs are standardized 6 in order that the
holders of such securities are treated equally. The main distinction from
a traditional debt security lies in the feature that a part of the total cash
flows of the commodity contingent security is directly linked to the price
of some (possibly) internationally traded commodity which the issuing
enterprise is engaged in producing. Secondary markets in these securities
are likely to be active, implying high liquidity. This is precisely the at-
traction behind having a secondary market, which would otherwise be
costly in terms of issuance and other expenses. Furthermore, secondary
15 The Capital Market Law (with Recent Amendments) 3-28 (1992).
16 Standardization refers to the specification of all fiduciary and legal features of the security
such as the face value, term to maturity, conditions of delivery etc. The sole variable that remains is
the market price of the security, which is the basis of negotiation between the two counterparties.
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market trading would establish a market valuation of the debt, in con-
trast to a debt which appears only on the books of the bank, and thus any
change in the value of the debt due to marketwide conditions is not re-
ported except in cases of default.
For the actual design of CCS one simple criterion should be the
guiding principle. Securities with different payoff possibilities will gener-
ally lead to different default probabilities, and accordingly, different
premia charged on them. It is then required that the security design min-
imize this default risk premium subject to the constraint that the risk-
adjusted value of securities is at least equal to the amount of finance nec-
essary. In theory, if the penalty of default, which includes both cash
payments and the future restriction to the capital markets, is known,
then design is straightforward. However this penalty function may not
be well-known. In light of this possibility, tying up debt service with the
value of the CCS directly linked with the export earnings from the bor-
rower presents a direct and appealing solution. That is, payments on
borrowings are directly linked to the export revenues of the issuer. A
possible problem which could possibly arise under this framework in-
volves the possibility of the issuer manipulating his output and stock de-
cisions to bias his export earnings. This can be tackled by employing
standard methods of minimum deductibles and tying export revenues to
international prices of the traded commodities.
Commodity contingency can be obtained when facing the prospect
of commodity price uncertainty by hedging in the forward markets if
they are available. In such an arrangement the straight debt is combined
with the sale of the appropriate commodity forward contract. The effect
of this for payments can be written as:
P(S(m)) = Po + S(M) - F (1)
where P(S(m)) is the payment to be made if the state of the world, m,
arises. 7 P0 is the amount to be paid that is independent of the state de-
pendent commodity price, S(m), and F is the forwards price. This im-
plies a constant cash-flow to the issuer of C(s) = F p Po.
There are some caveats to introducing commodity contingency
through the use of forward contracts. Clearly the separate forward con-
tract initiates an additional source of credit risk. Thus, when the com-
modity price is low, the issuer may have the incentive to deliver on the
forward sale while at the same time defaulting on the debt payment, if
the low commodity prices depress the value of future access to capital
17 State of the world is understood in the probabilistic sense, i.e., what type of market price for
the commodity emerges. The number of such possible states are m = 1,2 .... M.
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markets and the cash penalty is insignificant. This scenario can be
avoided if the forward contract is held as collateral against the debt or if
the debt plus forward is combined into a single security, which is the
commodity contingent bond.
Although the CCS will necessarily alleviate the problem of multiple
sources of credit risk, it will not necessarily guarantee that the scheduled
payments on the borrowings are less than or equal to the sum of cash
penalties, access to capital markets, and other costs to the creditor. For
example, when the commodity prices are high and perhaps rising, the
incentive to default may also rise if the cash penalty and access value do
not rise at the same rate as the commodity price. Thus the producer may
retain the profits of the commodity price boom and, beyond a certain
range of high commodity prices, the value of access to capital markets
may actually fall. It is with such circumstances in mind that we suggest
that the CCS be designed to include a simultaneous purchase of a com-
modity call option, with an exercise price greater than the price of the
forward contract:
P(m) = Po + S(m) - F p Max(0,S(m) - K) (2)
The Max function of the above equation represents the payoff from the
commodity call option (see Figure 5). This structure allows for the pos-
sibility of zero or negative payments if in certain states the commodity
price falls to a level such that S(m) < F - P0. This possibility is obvi-
ously unattractive to potential investors. To circumvent this problem the
instrument can be packaged to contain in addition to the instruments
specified above, a written call option with a lower exercise price, such
that the payments are:
P(m) = Po + Max (0,S(m) p K) - Max(OS(m) - K2) (3)
where the second part of the payoff is the premium of the written call
with the exercise price K, < K2. This security, containing two calls on
the same underlying commodity, obtains a guaranteed minimum pay-
ment, P(m) = PO, has a range of commodity prices for which the pay-
ments rise, and has a maximum payment of P(m) = Po + K2 - K1.
When the commodity price goes to a level lower than K1, the penalties of
non-payment will also fall and the instrument will deliver a larger insur-
ance premium. This will, of course, be more attractive to the investors
and lead to greater amounts of forthcoming capital. In the next section
two examples of CCS design are considered. The first one combines a
straight debt with a call option on the price of the underlying commodity
(i.e. only a cash settlement is allowed with no physical delivery of the
Commodity Indexed Securitization
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commodity), and the second one adds an additional option to the first
design.
A. An Example
Consider a security that could be issued by a cotton producing and
processing company. It is comprised of:
0 L units of a standard coupon paying bond, paying a fixed coupon
of $A semiannually, until maturity which is T years hence;
* N units of a zero coupon note, which at maturity would pay an
amount equal to q times the excess of the price of cotton over $K per
bale capped at $X per bale.
Figure 5 presents the payoff at maturity of this security as it varies
with the price of the underlying commodity (measured along the hori-
zontal axis) and consists of the net accrued value of the coupon payments
from the coupon bearing bonds and the amount from the commodity-
indexed part. This can be written as:
T-i
Net Payoff = JA(1 + r)T- + IN X Max[0,PT - $K]J Pr < $X (4)
i=1
Here PT stands for the international market price for cotton per bale at the
maturity date T. L and N are the number of units of each type of the con-
stituent securities, and q is a positive constant which is taken to be 1 in the
figures. The second part is isomorphous to a call option on the
commodity.
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Suppose the maturity of this instrument is two years (T=2), and the
price of the underlying commodity at maturity is PT = $20. The fixed cou-
pon on each of the L = 10 units of the straight debt A = $100, paid semian-
nually, the rate of interest reflecting the risk of the straight debt r = 0.1
annually, and if N = 100 are the values of the parameters, then the net
payoff of the CCS is $5525.63. The percentage holding period return would
depend on the initial investment on the straight debt and the commodity call
option. Note that the maximum value that this CCS can have is determined
by the cap on the option part. Suppose that the cap is set at $30, then the
maximum value of the option is $20 and the maximum value of the security
is also obtained at the same time. It is possible, of course, that the commod-
ity price could be below the exercise price at maturity. In that case the value
18 Isomorphous implies that the payoff is exactly similar to the payoff of a general call option
that is traded on an exchange. A call option is a contract that provides the holder the right but not
the obligation to purchase an underlying security such as a stock, at a pre-specified price within a
pre-specified period of time.
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Figure 5: Payoff for Debt Hybrid with Commodity Call
of the option part is zero, and consequently the accrued payoff from the debt
may not be sufficient to ensure a fair rate of return. To accommodate this
possibility, the face value of the debt may be adjusted accordingly to reflect a
discount, par, or premium with respect to the price of the bond.
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Figure 6: Payoff for Debt Hybrid with Commodity Call and Equity
Calls
It may be desirable to provide an equity ownership option to the inves-
tors, who at any time prior to or at maturity may find it attractive to partici-




simply by adding equity call option EC to the CCS package. This case is
presented in Figure 6. Now the value of EC will depend on the valuation of
the stock of the firm, which, in the case of SMEs, is in all likelihood not
trading publicly. Furthermore, its value will surely be positively correlated
with the price of the traded commodity, if the firm is a one-product firm.
These are important valuation issues for the CCS and pose some challenging
structures for multi-factor derivatives pricing. As the equity call gains value
the payoff to the lender increases. Figure 6 shows three increasing values of
the equity call at maturity, that lead to higher payoffs for all values of the
commodity price at maturity.
One aspect of commodity contingent design that arises is related to the
jurisdiction of regulatory agencies over these securities. In the presence of
multiple authorities, such as exists in the United States with the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTC), each authority competes for the regulation of these securi-
ties, which clearly straddle the line separating non-commodity and
commodity based instruments. To this issue, it is possible to refer to the
commodity independent yield criteria. Thus, if the security has a possible
payoff which is primarily (according to a legislated amount) composed of the
commodity part, then it falls under the purview of the CFTC or an
equivalent body. Conversely, if it is primarily a traditional debt or equity
instrument, it should fall under the jurisdiction of the SEC. Fortunately,
this complication does not arise in Turkey, since the Capital Market Board
is the sole authority over both commodities and traditional securities (with
the exception of currency based instruments, which are the responsibility of
the Finance Ministry).
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that commodity contingent securities are likely to
be successful in raising capital for enterprises in the emerging nations of
Central Asia and some former Soviet Republics. To this end we find that
the Republic of Turkey, with its democratic framework and experienced
capital markets, has the potential to perform a crucial service to its
neighboring nations that have not been served sufficiently by Western
financial intitutions. Additionally, we have found that, for reasons re-
lated to standardization and moral hazard, contingency based on non-
manipulable, internationally traded commodity prices provide the most
desirable CCS design. Furthermore, we have examined the regulatory
structure of Turkey as it applies to these potential markets. We find that
The Capital Market Law in its current version allows for flexibility of
CCS design while providing for required regulatory oversight. It would
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not be gross speculation, therefore, to believe that under such promising
conditions the market for CCS would perform much like the equities of
private commodity producers. Consequently, in combining futures and
forwards, ample vehicles for hedging and arbitrage can lead to a high
degree of liquidity in commodity contingent securities.
